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Abstract	  Interpretation	  of	  a	  pronoun	  in	  one	  clause	  can	  be	  systematically	  affected	  by	  the	  verb	  in	  the	  previous	  clause.	  Compare	  Archibald	  angered	  Bartholomew	  because	  he…	  (he=Archibald)	  with	  Archibald	  criticized	  Bartholomew	  because	  he…	  (he=Bartholomew).	  While	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  meaning	  plays	  a	  critical	  role,	  it	  is	  unclear	  whether	  that	  meaning	  is	  directly	  encoded	  in	  the	  verb	  or,	  alternatively,	  inferred	  from	  world	  knowledge.	  We	  report	  evidence	  favoring	  the	  former	  account.	  We	  elicited	  pronoun	  biases	  for	  502	  verbs	  from	  seven	  Levin	  verb	  classes	  in	  two	  discourse	  contexts	  (implicit	  causality	  and	  implicit	  consequentiality),	  showing	  that	  in	  both	  contexts,	  verb	  class	  reliably	  predicts	  pronoun	  bias.	  These	  results	  confirm	  and	  extend	  recent	  findings	  about	  implicit	  causality	  and	  represent	  the	  first	  such	  study	  for	  implicit	  consequentiality.	  We	  discuss	  these	  findings	  in	  the	  context	  of	  recent	  work	  in	  semantics,	  and	  also	  develop	  a	  new,	  probabilistic	  generative	  account	  of	  pronoun	  interpretation.	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   In	  the	  early	  1970s,	  Catherine	  Garvey	  and	  Alfonso	  Caramazza	  made	  an	  intriguing	  discovery:	  By	  changing	  the	  verb	  in	  one	  clause,	  they	  could	  radically	  change	  the	  interpretation	  of	  a	  pronoun	  in	  a	  subsequent	  clause	  (Garvey	  &	  Caramazza,	  1974;	  Garvey,	  Caramazza,	  &	  Yates,	  1974).	  	   (1)	   a.	  Archibald	  angered	  Bartholomew	  because	  he	  was	  reckless.	  	  	   	   b.	  Archibald	  criticized	  Bartholomew	  because	  he	  was	  reckless.	  Most	  individuals	  interpret	  he	  as	  referring	  to	  Archibald	  in	  (1a)	  and	  Bartholomew	  in	  (1b).	  Subsequent	  investigation	  revealed	  that	  this	  effect	  of	  the	  verb	  is	  independent	  of	  the	  content	  of	  the	  second	  clause:	  	   (2)	   a.	  Archibald	  angered	  Bartholomew	  because	  he...	  	  	   	   b.	  Archibald	  criticized	  Bartholomew	  because	  he...	  Importantly,	  this	  effect	  is	  a	  bias	  that	  can	  be	  overcome	  if	  it	  conflicts	  with	  material	  that	  comes	  after	  the	  pronoun	  (Archibald	  angered	  Bartholomew	  because	  he	  is	  irritable),	  albeit	  with	  a	  significant	  processing	  cost	  (Garvey	  et	  al.,	  1974).	  	  Numerous	  verbs	  have	  been	  identified	  that	  bias	  listeners	  to	  resolve	  the	  pronoun	  to	  the	  previous	  subject	  (e.g.,	  anger,	  delight,	  dare,	  trick),	  whereas	  many	  others	  bias	  listeners	  to	  resolve	  the	  pronoun	  to	  the	  previous	  object	  (e.g.,	  criticize,	  judge,	  love,	  hate).	  Garvey	  and	  Caramazza,	  who	  dubbed	  this	  phenomenon	  “implicit	  causality,”	  took	  it	  to	  indicate	  listeners’	  beliefs	  about	  causation:	  Listeners	  interpret	  the	  pronouns	  as	  they	  do	  because	  they	  understand	  Archibald	  to	  be	  the	  implicit	  cause	  of	  Archibald	  angered	  Bartholomew	  but	  understand	  Bartholomew	  to	  be	  the	  implicit	  cause	  of	  Archibald	  criticized	  Bartholomew.1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Note	  that	  “implicit	  causality”	  is	  also	  used	  to	  refer	  to	  a	  task	  in	  which	  people	  make	  inferences	  about	  various	  attributes	  of	  individuals	  based	  on	  events	  they	  have	  participated	  in	  (Brown	  &	  Fish,	  1983a).	  Though	  initially	  thought	  to	  be	  related,	  subsequent	  research	  has	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Implicit	  causality	  is	  not	  the	  only	  phenomenon	  in	  which	  pronoun	  interpretation	  is	  biased.	  In	  sentences	  where	  the	  second	  clause	  describes	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  first,	  a	  similar	  effect,	  known	  as	  “implicit	  consequentiality,”	  arises	  (Au,	  1986;	  Crinean	  &	  Garnham,	  2006;	  Pickering	  &	  Majid,	  2007;	  Stevenson,	  Crawley,	  &	  Kleinman,	  1994;	  Stewart,	  Pickering,	  &	  Sanford	  1998):	  (3)	   a.	  Because	  Archibald	  angered	  Bartholomew,	  he…	  [he=Bartholomew]	  	   b.	  Because	  Archibald	  liked	  Bartholomew,	  he…	  [he=Archibald]	  Again,	  some	  verbs	  bias	  pronoun	  interpretation	  towards	  the	  object	  (e.g.,	  anger,	  delight)	  and	  others	  towards	  the	  subject	  (e.g.,	  like,	  hate).	  Here,	  the	  relevant	  semantic	  distinction	  appears	  to	  be	  that	  one	  of	  the	  participants	  in	  the	  event	  is	  understood	  to	  have	  been	  more	  affected	  by	  the	  event,	  and	  thus	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  feature	  in	  consequences	  of	  the	  event.	  Note	  that	  the	  direction	  of	  a	  verb’s	  bias	  is	  not	  necessarily	  the	  same	  as	  for	  implicit	  causality.	  	  Although	  implicit	  causality	  and	  consequentiality	  were	  initially	  described	  as	  pronoun	  interpretation	  biases,	  recent	  empirical	  and	  theoretical	  results	  suggest	  that	  these	  biases	  are	  manifestations	  of	  a	  broader	  expectation	  about	  who	  will	  be	  mentioned	  next	  in	  some	  discourse	  (cf.	  Arnold,	  2001;	  Arnold,	  Brown-­‐Schmidt,	  &	  Trueswell,	  2007;	  Kehler,	  2002;	  Kehler,	  Kertz,	  Rohde,	  &	  Elman,	  2008).2	  If	  the	  next	  noun	  phrase	  is	  a	  pronoun,	  this	  expectation	  will	  color	  the	  interpretation	  of	  that	  pronoun	  (pronoun-­‐specific	  interpretation	  strategies	  may	  still	  apply).	  Support	  for	  this	  position	  comes	  from	  studies	  where	  participants	  provide	  continuations	  to	  sentences	  truncated	  before	  the	  pronoun	  (Archibald	  angered	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  found	  little	  or	  no	  relationship	  between	  the	  two	  kinds	  of	  implicit	  causality	  (Hartshorne,	  2014).	  All	  discussion	  of	  implicit	  causality	  in	  the	  present	  paper	  pertains	  to	  the	  original	  Garvey	  and	  Caramazza	  phenomenon.	  2	  An	  alternative	  is	  that	  these	  biases	  are	  in	  fact	  learned	  heuristics	  derived	  from	  the	  statistics	  of	  pronoun	  use	  itself,	  which	  are	  used	  to	  predict	  the	  likely	  reference	  of	  a	  pronoun	  (Crawley	  et	  al.,	  1990;	  Fletcher,	  1984).	  We	  return	  to	  this	  account	  in	  the	  General	  Discussion.	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Bartholomew	  because…),	  and	  researchers	  record	  who	  is	  mentioned	  in	  the	  continuation.	  The	  likelihood	  that	  the	  continuation	  provided	  by	  participants	  will	  mention	  a	  particular	  character	  correlates	  at	  ceiling	  rates	  with	  pronoun	  interpretation	  biases	  for	  equivalent	  sentences	  (Garvey	  et	  al.,	  1974;	  Hartshorne,	  2014;	  Kehler	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  We	  will	  use	  the	  more	  general	  term	  re-­‐mention	  bias	  to	  refer	  collectively	  to	  both	  production	  and	  interpretation	  biases,	  whether	  involving	  pronouns	  or	  other	  referring	  expressions	  (cf.	  Hartshorne,	  2014).	  Note	  that	  while	  implicit	  causality	  and	  consequentiality	  are	  the	  most	  frequently	  discussed	  re-­‐mention	  biases	  –	  and	  are	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  paper	  –	  they	  are	  likely	  just	  two	  examples	  of	  a	  broader	  phenomenon:	  There	  is	  some	  indication	  that	  verbs	  also	  have	  systematic	  effects	  in	  sentences	  connected	  by	  and,	  but,	  and	  other	  connectives	  (Erlich,	  1980;	  Koornneef	  &	  Sanders,	  2013;	  Featherstone	  &	  Sturt,	  2010;	  Rigalleau,	  Guerry,	  &	  Granjon,	  in	  press;	  Stevenson,	  Knott,	  Oberlander,	  &	  McDonald,	  2000).	  As	  research	  goes	  forward,	  it	  will	  be	  important	  to	  determine	  which	  results	  generalize	  to	  the	  broader	  class	  of	  phenomena.	  	  
World	  Knowledge	  or	  Language?	  	   Most	  researchers	  agree	  that	  intuitions	  about	  the	  causes	  and	  effects	  of	  events	  drive	  implicit	  causality	  and	  consequentiality	  biases.	  An	  open	  question	  –	  and	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  present	  study	  –	  is	  what	  information	  underlies	  these	  intuitions.	  Many	  researchers	  have	  argued	  that	  these	  intuitions	  must	  be	  partly	  or	  entirely	  inferred	  from	  general	  knowledge	  about	  the	  typical	  causes	  and	  effects	  of	  different	  kinds	  of	  events	  (Brown	  &	  Fish,	  1983a,	  1983b;	  Corrigan,	  2001,	  2002,	  2003;	  Pickering	  &	  Majid,	  2007;	  Semin	  &	  Fiedler,	  1991).	  These	  theories	  draw	  on	  a	  distinction	  between	  what	  is	  literally	  entailed	  by	  a	  sentence	  and	  what	  may	  be	  inferred	  based	  on	  additional,	  extra-­‐linguistic	  knowledge.	  For	  instance,	  consider	  Archibald	  was	  born	  two	  hundred	  years	  ago.	  This	  sentence	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literally	  conveys	  only	  that	  two	  hundred	  years	  have	  passed	  since	  Archibald’s	  birth.	  Most	  listeners	  will	  also	  conclude	  that	  Archibald	  is	  no	  longer	  alive,	  but	  this	  follows	  from	  our	  beliefs	  about	  normal	  human	  lifespans,	  not	  from	  the	  sentence	  itself.	  An	  optimist	  who	  holds	  out	  hope	  for	  Archibald’s	  continued	  vitality	  would	  be	  accused	  of	  misunderstanding	  the	  world,	  not	  the	  sentence.	  Advocates	  of	  the	  world	  knowledge	  approach	  to	  re-­‐mention	  biases	  argue	  that	  
Archibald	  angered	  Bartholomew	  does	  not	  entail	  anything	  about	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  anger.	  Rather,	  listeners	  must	  infer	  the	  likely	  cause	  based	  on	  what	  they	  have	  learned	  about	  typical	  causes	  and	  explanations	  of	  anger.	  Thus,	  on	  the	  world	  knowledge	  account,	  re-­‐mention	  biases	  are	  a	  probe	  into	  people’s	  knowledge	  and	  reasoning	  about	  the	  world.	  As	  such,	  implicit	  causality	  has	  been	  used	  to	  investigate	  adults’	  and	  children’s	  understanding	  of	  the	  causes	  of	  events	  (Au,	  1986),	  the	  stability	  of	  these	  beliefs	  across	  cultures	  (Brown	  &	  Fish,	  1983a),	  and	  people’s	  expectations	  about	  gender	  roles	  (Ferstl,	  Garnham,	  &	  Manouilidou,	  2011;	  Goikoetxea,	  Pascual,	  &	  Acha,	  2008;	  Mannetti	  &	  de	  Grada,	  1991).	  	  The	  alternative	  semantic	  structure	  account	  is	  that	  causes	  and	  consequences	  are	  not	  implicit	  but	  are	  actually	  part	  of	  the	  literal	  meaning	  of	  the	  verb	  (Arnold,	  2001;	  Brown	  &	  Fish,	  1983b;	  Crinean	  &	  Garnham,	  2006;	  Garvey	  &	  Caramazza,	  1974;	  Hartshorne	  &	  Snedeker,	  2013;	  Rudolph	  &	  Forsterling,	  1997;	  Stevenson	  et	  al.,	  2000).3	  Garvey	  and	  Caramazza	  (1974)	  suggested	  that	  verbs	  mark	  their	  subject	  or	  object	  (or	  neither)	  as	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  event.	  Subsequent	  researchers	  tried	  to	  reduce	  this	  “implicit	  cause”	  feature	  to	  aspects	  of	  verb	  lexical	  semantics,	  such	  as	  thematic	  roles	  (see	  especially	  Brown	  &	  Fish,	  1983b;	  Crinean	  &	  Garnham,	  2006).	  An	  action	  verb	  (kick,	  paint,	  break,	  throw)	  involves	  an	  AGENT	  (the	  subject)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  As	  indicated	  in	  the	  citations,	  Brown	  &	  Fish	  (1983b)	  have	  been	  influential	  in	  the	  development	  of	  both	  positions	  and	  can	  be	  read	  as	  supporting	  either	  one.	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effecting	  some	  change	  on	  the	  PATIENT	  (the	  object).	  Because	  AGENTS	  are	  by	  definition	  causal	  actors	  and	  PATIENTs	  by	  definition	  suffer	  some	  consequence	  as	  the	  result	  of	  the	  event,	  such	  verbs	  should	  be	  subject-­‐biased	  in	  implicit	  causality	  and	  object-­‐biased	  in	  implicit	  consequentiality.	  Thus,	  on	  this	  account,	  re-­‐mention	  biases	  are	  not	  probes	  into	  people’s	  knowledge	  about	  the	  world	  in	  a	  language-­‐independent	  manner	  but	  rather	  are	  probes	  into	  the	  semantic	  representations	  underlying	  basic	  linguistic	  processes.	  As	  such,	  the	  causality	  and	  consequentiality,	  etc.,	  in	  verbs	  is	  not	  so	  much	  implicit	  as	  explicit	  (hence	  the	  title	  of	  this	  paper).	  Thus	  while	  the	  world	  knowledge	  account	  predicts	  that	  changing	  facts	  about	  the	  world	  changes	  the	  IC	  bias	  of	  a	  verb,	  on	  the	  semantic	  structure	  account,	  facts	  about	  the	  world	  are	  relevant	  only	  in	  that	  they	  cause	  speakers	  to	  coin	  and	  use	  verbs	  that	  encode	  specific	  information	  about	  causality	  and	  affectedness.	  	  Two	  lines	  of	  evidence	  have	  been	  used	  to	  distinguish	  these	  accounts.	  Until	  recently,	  both	  favored	  the	  world	  knowledge	  account.	  First,	  preliminary	  evidence	  suggested	  that	  re-­‐mention	  biases	  were	  affected	  by	  not	  just	  the	  verb	  but	  also	  knowledge	  about	  the	  actors	  (i.e.,	  Archibald’s	  and	  Bartholomew’s	  genders,	  occupations,	  relative	  social	  status,	  etc.),	  supporting	  the	  conclusion	  that	  re-­‐mention	  biases	  are	  calculated	  over	  a	  rich	  representation	  of	  the	  event	  that	  incorporates	  substantial	  knowledge	  about	  the	  world	  (cf.	  Pickering	  &	  Majid,	  2007).	  However,	  the	  preliminary	  evidence	  that	  these	  additional	  factors	  modulated	  re-­‐mention	  biases	  largely	  failed	  to	  hold	  up	  under	  more	  systematic	  investigation	  (Goikoetxea	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Hartshorne,	  2014;	  see	  also	  Ferstl	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  Second,	  proponents	  of	  the	  semantic	  structure	  account	  have	  long	  had	  difficulty	  in	  finding	  a	  semantic	  characterization	  of	  verbs	  that	  correctly	  predicts	  re-­‐mention	  biases	  (for	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review,	  see	  Hartshorne	  &	  Snedeker,	  2013).	  For	  instance,	  on	  early	  accounts,	  agent-­‐patient	  verbs	  were	  predicted	  to	  be	  subject-­‐biased	  in	  implicit	  causality	  sentences,	  whereas	  in	  fact	  many	  are	  object-­‐biased	  (e.g.,	  criticize).	  This	  lead	  researchers	  to	  posit	  a	  new	  semantic	  role	  (EVOCATOR),	  which	  was	  circularly	  defined	  as	  a	  PATIENT	  that	  nonetheless	  attracts	  implicit	  causality	  bias	  (Au,	  1986;	  Rudolph	  &	  Forsterling,	  1997).	  The	  failure	  to	  formulate	  an	  accurate	  predictive	  theory	  has	  been	  seen	  as	  a	  challenge	  to	  the	  semantic	  structure	  account.	  Here,	  too,	  more	  recent	  evidence	  has	  begun	  challenge	  this	  conclusion,	  as	  we	  discuss	  in	  the	  following	  section.	  Before	  discussing	  this	  evidence,	  we	  note	  one	  potential	  liability	  for	  the	  world	  knowledge	  account.	  Numerous	  studies	  have	  now	  shown	  that	  at	  least	  in	  some	  cases	  implicit	  causality	  bias	  can	  affect	  pronoun	  interpretation	  within	  about	  half	  a	  second	  of	  encountering	  the	  pronoun,	  if	  not	  earlier	  (Cozijn,	  Commandeur,	  Vonk,	  &	  Noordman,	  2011;	  Featherstone	  &	  Sturt,	  2010;	  Koornneef	  &	  Sanders,	  2012;	  Koornneef	  &	  van	  Berkum,	  2006;	  Pyykkonen	  &	  Jarvikivi,	  2010).	  This	  raises	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  this	  is	  sufficient	  time	  for	  complex	  inferences	  based	  on	  unconstrained	  amounts	  of	  world	  knowledge.	  In	  contrast,	  it	  has	  long	  been	  established	  that	  listeners	  can	  use	  the	  lexical	  semantics	  of	  verbs	  to	  predict	  upcoming	  words	  within	  a	  few	  hundred	  milliseconds	  of	  encountering	  the	  verb	  (Altmann	  &	  Kamide,	  1999).4	  
Finer-­‐Grained	  Semantic	  Representations	  Hartshorne	  and	  Snedeker	  (2013)	  –	  henceforth	  H&S	  –	  provided	  new	  evidence	  that	  semantic	  structure	  drives	  implicit	  causality.	  They	  noted	  that	  contemporary	  work	  in	  verb	  semantics	  has	  found	  it	  necessary	  to	  invoke	  much	  richer,	  finer-­‐grained	  semantic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  We	  thank	  Andrew	  Stewart	  for	  pointing	  this	  out.	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representations	  than	  those	  considered	  in	  the	  re-­‐mention	  literature.	  For	  instance,	  Crinean	  and	  Garnham	  (2006)	  invoke	  only	  5	  semantic	  roles,	  whereas	  contemporary	  semantic	  role	  theories	  may	  have	  several	  dozen	  (Kipper,	  Korhonen,	  Ryant,	  &	  Palmer,	  2006;	  Schuler,	  2005;	  for	  review,	  see	  Levin	  &	  Rappaport	  Hovav,	  2005).	  Many	  theorists	  have	  also	  argued	  that	  treating	  semantic	  roles	  as	  primitives	  (as	  is	  done	  in	  the	  re-­‐mention	  literature)	  results	  in	  too	  brittle	  a	  theory,	  and	  they	  have	  argued	  for	  more	  articulated	  representations	  (for	  review,	  see	  Levin	  &	  Rappaport	  Hovav,	  2005).	  Thus,	  since	  semantic	  structure	  accounts	  have	  invoked	  primitive	  semantic	  roles	  that	  are	  too	  coarse-­‐grained,	  it	  is	  perhaps	  not	  surprising	  that	  they	  over-­‐generalized.	  H&S	  also	  noted	  that	  all	  contemporary	  theories	  of	  verb	  semantics	  incorporate	  notions	  of	  causation	  and	  affectedness	  as	  core	  components	  of	  meaning;	  it	  would	  be	  surprising	  if	  these	  did	  not	  play	  a	  role	  in	  implicit	  causality	  and	  consequentiality,	  respectively.	  How	  to	  best	  characterize	  verb	  meanings	  remains	  an	  area	  of	  active	  research	  (Levin	  and	  Rappaport	  Hovav,	  2005).	  H&S	  abstracted	  away	  from	  specific	  proposals	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  verb	  classes	  provided	  in	  the	  comprehensive	  and	  authoritative	  classification	  of	  Levin	  (1993),	  as	  modified	  and	  extended	  in	  VerbNet	  (Kipper	  et	  al,	  2006;	  Schuler,	  2005).	  Levin	  verb	  classes	  result	  from	  categorizing	  verbs	  according	  to	  the	  syntactic	  frames	  in	  which	  they	  can	  appear:	  While	  break,	  roll,	  hit,	  and	  push	  can	  all	  be	  used	  in	  transitive	  frames	  (Archibald	  
broke/rolled/hit/pushed	  the	  vase),	  only	  the	  first	  two	  can	  be	  used	  intransitively	  (The	  vase	  
broke/rolled/*hit/*pushed).	  Substantial	  evidence	  has	  amassed	  indicating	  that	  which	  verbs	  can	  appear	  in	  which	  syntactic	  frames	  is	  largely	  or	  entirely	  a	  function	  of	  core	  semantic	  features,	  including	  causation	  and	  affectedness	  (Ambridge,	  Pine,	  Rowland,	  Jones,	  &	  Clark,	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2009;	  Croft,	  2012;	  Goldberg,	  2003;	  Jackendoff,	  1990;	  Levin	  &	  Rappaport	  Hovav,	  2005;	  Pinker,	  1989;	  Tenny	  &	  Pustejovsky,	  2000;	  inter	  alia).5	  	  Thus,	  H&S	  asked	  whether	  verbs	  in	  the	  same	  syntactic	  class	  would	  share	  the	  same	  implicit	  causality	  bias.	  If	  so,	  that	  suggests	  that	  the	  same	  underlying	  semantic	  structure	  that	  drives	  Levin	  verb	  classes	  also	  drives	  re-­‐mention	  biases.	  H&S	  focused	  on	  five	  verb	  classes,	  finding	  just	  such	  a	  pattern	  (Figure	  1).	  Moreover,	  which	  classes	  were	  biased	  in	  which	  direction	  matched	  previous	  suggestions	  as	  to	  how	  causality	  is	  (or	  is	  not)	  encoded	  by	  verbs	  in	  those	  classes.	  	  
	  
Figure	  1.	  Pronoun	  interpretation	  biases	  in	  explanatory	  (“implicit	  causality”)	  sentences	  (e.g.,	  2-­‐4)	  for	  the	  five	  verb	  classes	  (identified	  by	  VerbNet	  class	  number6)	  investigated	  in	  Hartshorne	  and	  Snedeker	  (2013),	  plotted	  by	  verb.	  For	  verbs	  that	  were	  tested	  in	  both	  Exp.	  1	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and	  Exp.	  2,	  the	  results	  of	  the	  two	  experiments	  have	  been	  combined.	  	  
	  
Motivation	  for	  Current	  Study	  	   The	  experiment	  presented	  in	  this	  paper	  has	  three	  main	  goals.	  First,	  H&S	  showed	  that,	  at	  least	  in	  some	  cases,	  implicit	  causality	  bias	  is	  systematically	  predictable	  from	  Levin/VerbNet	  verb	  class,	  as	  is	  predicted	  by	  the	  semantic	  structure	  account.	  Below,	  we	  test	  whether	  this	  finding	  extends	  to	  implicit	  consequentiality.	  There	  is	  some	  preliminary	  evidence	  that	  it	  may:	  Stewart	  and	  colleagues	  (1998)	  elicited	  result	  biases	  for	  49	  verbs	  (reported	  in	  Crinean	  &	  Garnham,	  2006),	  most	  of	  which	  are	  members	  of	  VerbNet	  classes	  31.1	  (amuse),	  31.2	  (admire),	  or	  33	  (acclaim).	  All	  of	  the	  class	  31.1	  verbs	  (N=11)	  were	  object-­‐biased,	  all	  of	  the	  class	  31.2	  verbs	  (N=18)	  were	  subject-­‐biased,	  and	  all	  but	  one	  of	  the	  class	  33	  verbs	  (N=9)	  were	  object-­‐biased,	  with	  the	  one	  exception	  (honor)	  being	  only	  slightly	  subject-­‐biased.	  Second,	  of	  the	  five	  syntactic	  classes	  investigated	  by	  H&S,	  only	  two	  were	  tested	  exhaustively,	  with	  only	  a	  sample	  of	  verbs	  tested	  in	  the	  other	  three	  classes.	  In	  this	  study,	  we	  exhaustively	  test	  implicit	  causality	  and	  consequentiality	  biases	  for	  seven	  verb	  classes	  –including	  the	  five	  for	  which	  H&S	  investigated	  implicit	  causality	  bias.	  Finally,	  as	  noted	  by	  both	  Rudolph	  and	  Forsterling	  (1997)	  and	  H&S,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  tendency	  in	  the	  re-­‐mention	  literature	  to	  focus	  on	  a	  small	  set	  of	  about	  four	  dozen	  verbs	  drawn	  from	  Garvey	  et	  al.	  (1974)	  and	  Brown	  and	  Fish	  (1983b),	  resulting	  in	  theories	  being	  overfit	  to	  this	  narrow	  sample.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  implicit	  causality,	  this	  issue	  has	  lately	  been	  ameliorated	  by	  the	  publication	  of	  several	  large	  datasets	  involving	  hundreds	  of	  verbs	  (Ferstl	  et	  al.,	  2011;	  Goikoetxea	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Hartshorne	  &	  Snedeker,	  2013).	  Nevertheless,	  this	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remains	  an	  issue	  for	  implicit	  consequentiality.	  To	  address	  this	  issue,	  we	  report	  implicit	  consequentiality	  biases	  for	  502	  verbs.	  
Experiment	  We	  tested	  implicit	  causality	  and	  consequentiality	  biases	  for	  a	  comprehensive	  sample	  of	  verbs	  in	  each	  of	  seven	  syntactic	  classes	  (Table	  1).	  These	  were	  the	  five	  classes	  tested	  by	  Hartshorne	  and	  Snedeker	  (2013),	  plus	  two	  additional	  classes	  (31.3	  and	  31.4),	  which	  consist	  of	  the	  emotion	  verbs7	  that	  take	  indirect	  objects	  rather	  than	  direct	  objects	  (classes	  31.1	  and	  31.2).	  Classes	  31.1	  (amuse),	  31.2	  (admire),	  and	  33	  (acclaim)	  are	  three	  classes	  of	  verbs	  frequently	  discussed	  in	  the	  re-­‐mention	  bias	  literature:	  experiencer-­‐object	  emotion	  verbs,	  experiencer-­‐subject	  emotion	  verbs,	  and	  judgment	  verbs	  (cf.	  Crinean	  &	  Garnham,	  2006;	  Hartshorne	  &	  Snedeker,	  2013;	  Rudolph	  &	  Forsterling,	  1997).	  Note	  that	  our	  present	  focus	  is	  whether	  the	  class	  of	  each	  verb	  predicts	  its	  re-­‐mention	  bias.	  In	  the	  General	  Discussion,	  we	  discuss	  the	  results	  in	  terms	  of	  current	  theories	  of	  verb	  semantics.	  
Method	  
Subjects	  	   1,638	  native	  English-­‐speaking	  volunteers	  (ages	  18-­‐81,	  M=32,	  SD=14;	  991	  female)	  who	  reported	  no	  history	  of	  dyslexia	  or	  psychiatric	  disorders	  and	  who	  were	  aged	  18	  to	  81	  completed	  the	  experiment	  through	  the	  Web	  portal	  gameswithwords.org.	  Children	  under	  18	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  In	  the	  psycholinguistic	  literature,	  emotion	  verbs	  have	  often	  been	  grouped	  together	  with	  propositional	  attitude	  verbs	  (think,	  believe)	  and	  education	  verbs	  (teach,	  learn).	  Collectively,	  these	  verbs	  are	  known	  as	  “psych	  verbs”.	  Because	  these	  verbs	  appear	  in	  distinct	  verb	  classes,	  we	  discuss	  them	  separately.	  Moreover,	  H&S	  found	  little	  evidence	  that	  these	  different	  types	  of	  psych	  verbs	  pattern	  similarly	  with	  regards	  to	  re-­‐mention	  biases.	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were	  excluded	  because	  they	  potentially	  do	  not	  know	  low-­‐frequency	  words.	  Two	  participants	  aged	  96	  and	  100	  were	  excluded	  for	  having	  implausible	  ages.	  An	  additional	  201	  participants	  were	  excluded	  for	  missing	  more	  than	  one	  of	  the	  control	  questions	  (see	  below).	  Varying	  the	  exclusion	  criteria	  had	  little	  effect	  on	  the	  results.	  
Materials	  and	  Procedure	  	   An	  archived	  version	  of	  the	  experiment	  may	  be	  viewed	  at	  www.gameswithwords.org/PronounSleuth.	  Each	  participant	  judged	  fourteen	  implicit	  causality	  sentences	  (4)	  and	  fourteen	  implicit	  consequentiality	  sentences	  (5).	  For	  each	  participant,	  the	  order	  of	  the	  sentence	  types	  was	  randomized.	  (4) Sally	  VERBed	  Mary	  because	  she	  daxed.	  (5) 	  Because	  Sally	  VERBed	  Mary,	  she	  daxed.	  
Participants	  were	  asked	  “Who	  do	  you	  think	  daxed?”	  and	  asked	  to	  choose	  the	  subject	  (Sally)	  or	  the	  object	  (Mary).	  In	  order	  to	  account	  for	  any	  bias	  to	  choose	  the	  name	  based	  on	  position	  (left	  or	  right),	  the	  order	  of	  the	  clickable	  options	  was	  randomized	  on	  each	  trial.	  	  The	  names	  of	  the	  characters	  (Sally,	  Mary)	  and	  the	  novel	  verb	  (daxed,	  gorped)	  were	  sampled	  without	  replacement	  from	  a	  set	  of	  70	  common	  and	  unambiguously	  female	  names	  chosen	  from	  the	  (USA)	  Social	  Security	  Administration	  database	  and	  32	  novel	  verbs,	  respectively.	  Participants	  were	  told	  that	  some	  real	  words	  had	  been	  replaced	  with	  novel	  words	  (e.g.,	  daxed)	  in	  order	  to	  make	  the	  task	  more	  challenging;	  this	  manipulation	  was	  intended	  to	  ensure	  that	  sentence	  content	  after	  the	  pronoun	  could	  have	  little	  effect	  on	  pronoun	  interpretation	  (cf	  Hartshorne	  &	  Snedeker,	  2013;	  Hartshorne,	  Sudo	  &	  Uruwashi,	  2013).	  The	  use	  of	  randomly-­‐chosen	  common	  names	  had	  a	  similar	  purpose.	  	  Each	  participant	  was	  thus	  tested	  on	  28	  verbs,	  which	  were	  chosen	  randomly	  without	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replacement	  from	  the	  total	  set	  of	  502.	  These	  represented	  nearly	  all	  the	  verbs	  in	  seven	  VerbNet	  classes	  (see	  Table	  1),	  excluding	  those	  which	  can	  appear	  in	  another	  class	  as	  a	  simple	  transitive	  with	  two	  animate	  arguments	  and	  thus	  are	  polysemous.	  One	  class	  31.1	  verb	  (dumbfounded)	  was	  misspelled	  and	  thus	  is	  excluded	  from	  analyses.	  Examples	  of	  each	  class	  are	  given	  in	  Table	  1.	  	  Because	  we	  aimed	  for	  an	  exhaustive	  test	  of	  the	  semantic-­‐structure	  hypothesis,	  we	  included	  all	  relevant	  verbs.	  However,	  we	  note	  that	  some	  of	  the	  verbs	  were	  only	  marginally	  acceptable	  in	  the	  transitive	  construction	  (Archibald	  coaxed	  Bill).	  Because	  we	  presented	  the	  verbs	  in	  transitive	  sentences,	  this	  lower	  acceptability	  could	  result	  in	  participants	  having	  weaker	  intuitions	  about	  these	  sentences,	  increasing	  noise.	  Note	  that	  this	  should	  work	  against	  our	  hypothesis,	  attenuating	  any	  relationship	  between	  verb	  class	  re-­‐mention	  bias.	  Any	  evidence	  we	  find	  of	  such	  a	  relationship	  would	  be	  that	  much	  more	  compelling.8	  	   Four	  catch	  trials	  were	  included	  where	  the	  pronoun	  was	  disambiguated	  by	  gender	  (e.g.,	  Sally	  thanked	  John	  because	  he	  daxed).	  Participants	  who	  made	  more	  than	  one	  error	  on	  these	  catch	  trials	  were	  excluded.	  	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  We	  thank	  Jennifer	  Arnold	  for	  raising	  this	  point.	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  Table	  1	   	  
The	  verb	  classes	  investigated	  in	  Experiment	  1.	  	  Class	   	   N	   Examples	  31.1	   	   191	   amuse,	  baffle,	  disappoint,	  surprise,	  worry	  31.2	   	   38	   admire,	  dislike,	  envy,	  fear,	  resent,	  respect	  31.3	   	   61	   agonize	  over,	  care	  about,	  fear	  for	  31.4	   	   3	   appeal	  to,	  grate	  on,	  jar	  on	  33	   	   73	   acclaim,	  blame,	  forgive,	  praise,	  scorn	  45.4	   	   95	   age,	  animate,	  awaken,	  mellow,	  popularize	  59	   	   41	   coax,	  dare,	  deceive,	  influence,	  trick	  
Note	  that	  the	  verb	  class	  numbers	  are	  those	  used	  by	  VerbNet	  (Kipper	  et	  al.,	  2006),	  an	  extension	  
of	  the	  original	  work	  by	  Levin	  (1993).	  	  
Results	  
Description	  of	  analyses	  	   Each	  verb	  was	  judged	  in	  an	  average	  of	  40	  implicit	  causality	  and	  40	  implicit	  consequentiality	  sentences	  (Range=24-­‐69,	  SD=7).	  Because	  generalization	  across	  items	  is	  of	  primary	  interest,	  and	  because	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  data	  collection	  does	  not	  readily	  permit	  by-­‐subjects	  analyses,	  analyses	  below	  are	  conducted	  by	  item	  only.	  	  	   Although	  re-­‐mention	  biases	  are	  usually	  reported	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  percentage	  of	  participants	  resolving	  the	  pronoun	  to	  the	  previous	  subject,	  the	  use	  of	  this	  non-­‐linear	  scale	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distorts	  effect	  sizes,	  violates	  the	  assumptions	  of	  standard	  analysis	  techniques	  (e.g.,	  ANOVA,	  regression),	  and	  generally	  complicates	  interpretation.9	  Thus,	  we	  linearized	  the	  results	  with	  the	  empirical	  logit	  transformation	  (Haldane,	  1955).	  As	  a	  result,	  positive	  values	  indicate	  a	  subject	  bias,	  negative	  values	  indicate	  an	  object	  bias,	  and	  zero	  indicates	  no	  bias.	  Absolute	  numerical	  results	  for	  all	  502	  verbs	  are	  listed	  the	  appendix.	  
Implicit	  Consequentiality.	  	   Across	  verbs,	  we	  observed	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  implicit	  consequentiality	  biases,	  with	  a	  slight	  overall	  object	  bias	  (Figure	  2).	  However,	  as	  shown	  in	  Figure	  3,	  these	  biases	  were	  a	  systematic	  function	  of	  verb	  class.	  All	  seven	  classes	  showed	  a	  significant	  bias	  in	  two-­‐tailed	  t-­‐tests	  (ps<.05),	  though	  the	  result	  for	  class	  31.4	  (which	  consists	  of	  only	  three	  verbs)	  would	  not	  have	  survived	  correction	  for	  multiple	  comparisons	  (t(2)=4.8,	  p=.04).	  The	  two	  experiencer-­‐subject	  classes	  (31.2	  and	  31.3)	  were	  subject-­‐biased.	  The	  other	  five	  classes	  were	  object-­‐biased.	  These	  findings	  replicate	  and	  extend	  Stewart	  and	  colleagues’	  (1998)	  observations	  that	  class	  31.1	  verbs	  are	  more	  object-­‐biased	  in	  implicit	  consequentiality	  than	  are	  classes	  31.2	  and	  33.	  	   We	  conducted	  pairwise	  comparisons	  of	  classes.	  Only	  comparisons	  that	  are	  significant	  below	  the	  Sidak-­‐correction	  alpha	  of	  0.002	  (adjusted	  for	  21	  comparisons)	  are	  considered	  significant.	  As	  such,	  the	  two	  experiencer-­‐subject	  classes	  (31.2,	  and	  31.3)	  were	  not	  significantly	  different	  from	  one	  another	  (t(97)=2.8,	  p=.006),	  but	  both	  were	  significantly	  different	  from	  all	  other	  classes	  (ps<.002)	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  the	  under-­‐powered	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  A	  scale	  is	  linear	  if	  a	  change	  of	  d	  units	  has	  equal	  value	  at	  any	  point	  in	  the	  scale.	  Percentages	  violate	  this	  rule:	  The	  difference	  between	  50%	  and	  51%	  (d=1%)	  is	  less	  meaningful	  than	  the	  difference	  between	  99%	  and	  100%	  (d=1%).	  This	  complicates	  comparison	  of	  results,	  since	  large	  numerical	  differences	  can	  actually	  be	  “smaller”	  than	  small	  numerical	  differences.	  For	  demonstration	  and	  discussion,	  see	  Jaeger	  (2008).	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comparisons	  with	  classes	  31.3	  and	  31.4	  (t(62)=2.0,	  p=.05).	  The	  other	  five	  classes	  did	  not	  differ	  significantly	  from	  one	  another,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  classes	  31.1	  and	  45.4	  (t(283)=3.6,	  p=.0003).10	  	  
	  
Figure	  2.	  A	  histogram	  of	  implicit	  consequentiality	  biases	  by	  verb,	  in	  result	  sentences.	  Note	  that	  at	  this	  scale	  one	  extremely	  subject-­‐biased	  verb	  (feared	  for,	  class	  31.3)	  is	  not	  visible.	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Figure	  3.	  Implicit	  consequentiality	  biases	  by	  verb,	  analyzed	  separately	  by	  verb	  class.	  Note	  that	  at	  this	  scale	  one	  extremely	  subject-­‐biased	  verb	  (feared	  for,	  class	  31.3)	  is	  not	  visible.	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correction	  for	  21	  comparisons	  (alpha=.002),	  are	  as	  follows:	  31.1	  &	  31.4	  (t(191)<1),	  31.4	  &	  59	  (t(42)=1.4,	  p=.17),	  31.2	  &	  33	  (t(109)<1),	  and	  45.4	  &	  59	  (t(134)=2.7,	  p=.007).	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Figure	  5.	  Boxplots	  of	  explanation	  biases,	  analyzed	  separately	  by	  verb	  class.	  Note	  that	  at	  this	  scale	  two	  extremely	  object-­‐biased	  verbs	  (shushed,	  class	  45.4;	  upbraided,	  class	  33)	  are	  not	  visible.	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informative	  about	  implicit	  causality	  and	  consequentiality	  bias.11	  
Discussion	  We	  replicated	  and	  extended	  Hartshorne	  &	  Snedeker's	  (2013)	  finding	  that	  implicit	  causality	  bias	  is	  a	  systematic	  function	  of	  Levin	  verb	  class,	  and	  we	  extended	  these	  findings	  to	  implicit	  consequentiality.	  Importantly,	  although	  Levin	  verb	  classes	  are	  defined	  syntactically,	  we	  do	  not	  interpret	  this	  as	  an	  effect	  of	  syntax	  per	  se:	  Rather,	  both	  syntactic	  class	  and	  re-­‐mention	  biases	  are	  likely	  a	  function	  of	  whether	  and	  how	  verbs	  specify	  causality,	  affectedness,	  and	  other	  semantic	  features	  (see	  footnote	  3;	  Levin	  1993;	  Levin	  &	  Rappaport	  Hovav,	  2005).	  These	  results	  are	  predicted	  by	  the	  semantic	  structure	  account,	  on	  which	  the	  semantic	  information	  responsible	  for	  re-­‐mention	  biases	  is	  read	  off	  the	  linguistic	  signal	  itself,	  rather	  than	  being	  inferred	  from	  general	  knowledge	  about	  the	  world.	  On	  this	  view,	  implicit	  causality	  and	  consequentiality	  are	  quite	  explicit	  in	  language.	  	  The	  world	  knowledge	  account	  was	  formulated	  to	  explain	  how	  people	  infer	  the	  causes	  and	  consequences	  of	  linguistically-­‐encoded	  events	  (e.g.,	  Archibald	  angered	  
Bartholomew).	  However,	  linguistic	  meaning	  appears	  to	  be	  sufficient	  to	  explain	  much	  of	  the	  phenomenon,	  and	  it	  is	  not	  currently	  clear	  whether	  world	  knowledge	  plays	  any	  additional	  role.	  Further	  development	  of	  the	  world	  knowledge	  account	  would	  require	  meeting	  three	  challenges.	  First,	  one	  would	  need	  to	  explain	  why	  listeners	  infer	  causality	  and	  affectedness	  from	  world	  knowledge	  rather	  than	  simply	  using	  the	  information	  about	  causality	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  We	  assessed	  significance	  with	  a	  permutation	  analysis:	  We	  randomly	  reassigned	  verbs	  to	  verb	  class	  with	  the	  constraint	  that	  the	  number	  of	  verbs	  in	  each	  class	  remain	  the	  same,	  and	  then	  refit	  the	  model.	  We	  repeated	  this	  process	  1,000	  times.	  In	  all	  1,000	  iterations,	  the	  standard	  deviation	  of	  the	  random	  intercepts	  and	  slopes	  was	  much	  greater	  than	  the	  true	  model,	  never	  dropping	  below	  1.15	  and	  1.58,	  respectively.	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affectedness	  conveyed	  by	  the	  verb.	  Second,	  one	  would	  need	  to	  actually	  show	  that	  people’s	  (nonlinguistic)	  beliefs	  about	  the	  likely	  causes	  and	  results	  actually	  predict	  re-­‐mention	  bias,	  a	  core	  prediction	  that	  surprisingly	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  tested.	  	  Finally,	  one	  would	  need	  to	  show	  that	  world	  knowledge-­‐based	  inferences	  could	  be	  calculated	  quickly	  enough	  to	  match	  the	  speed	  with	  which	  re-­‐mention	  biases	  appear	  online	  (cf.	  Koornneef	  &	  van	  Berkum,	  2006,	  
inter	  alia).	  	  Note	  that	  despite	  the	  role	  of	  verb	  semantics,	  re-­‐mention	  biases	  remain	  a	  pragmatic	  inference,	  albeit	  a	  semantically-­‐derived	  one.	  For	  convenience,	  researchers	  often	  refer	  to	  the	  cause	  of	  an	  event,	  though	  in	  fact	  any	  event	  has	  multiple	  causes	  and	  thus	  can	  be	  explained	  in	  multiple	  ways;	  at	  best,	  listeners	  can	  only	  make	  reasonable	  guesses	  as	  to	  what	  cause	  is	  most	  likely	  to	  be	  discussed	  (cf.	  Pickering	  &	  Majid,	  2007).12	  The	  fact	  that	  listeners	  expect	  explanations	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  cause	  highlighted	  by	  the	  verb	  and	  consequences	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  entity	  marked	  as	  affected	  by	  the	  verb	  remains	  an	  inference	  and	  is	  sometimes	  incorrect	  (Caramazza	  et	  al.,	  1977).	  	  Our	  conclusions	  here	  might	  seem	  a	  disappointment	  to	  those	  who	  see	  re-­‐mention	  biases	  as	  an	  example	  of	  complex	  world	  knowledge	  inferences	  rapidly	  guiding	  sentence	  processing.	  However,	  this	  does	  not	  make	  re-­‐mention	  biases	  less	  interesting.	  To	  the	  contrary,	  re-­‐mention	  biases	  highlight	  the	  communicative	  power	  of	  language:	  Rather	  than	  requiring	  listeners	  to	  infer	  causes	  and	  consequences	  using	  general	  reasoning	  skills,	  language	  specifies	  (some	  of	  the)	  causes	  and	  consequences	  of	  events.	  An	  interesting	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Causes	  of	  an	  event	  (Archibald	  angered	  Bartholomew)	  include	  both	  the	  power	  of	  the	  agent	  to	  realize	  some	  effect	  (causing	  anger)	  and	  the	  liability	  of	  the	  patient	  to	  be	  affected	  (the	  ability	  to	  be	  angry)	  (cf.	  White,	  1989).	  Moreover,	  there	  are	  proximate	  causes	  (Archibald	  
punching	  Bartholomew	  in	  the	  nose)	  and	  prior	  causes	  (Archibald’s	  troubled	  upbringing,	  which	  
made	  him	  violent).	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question	  for	  future	  research	  is	  whether	  speakers	  strategically	  choose	  which	  verb	  to	  use	  to	  describe	  an	  event	  based	  on	  what	  aspects	  of	  event	  structure	  they	  wish	  to	  highlight.	  In	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  section,	  we	  address	  three	  issues.	  First,	  we	  address	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  observed	  stronger	  object	  biases	  in	  implicit	  causality	  in	  the	  present	  experiment	  than	  did	  H&S.	  Second,	  we	  discuss	  the	  re-­‐mention	  biases	  observed	  for	  different	  verb	  classes	  in	  the	  context	  of	  prior	  semantics	  research.	  Finally,	  we	  address	  the	  question	  of	  why	  and	  how	  listeners	  make	  use	  of	  semantics	  to	  guide	  re-­‐mention	  biases.	  
The	  Object	  Shift	  	   Overall,	  in	  the	  present	  study	  the	  implicit	  causality	  biases	  were	  shifted	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  object	  relative	  to	  the	  results	  in	  H&S.	  Although	  this	  unexpected	  result	  is	  orthogonal	  to	  our	  primary	  question	  (are	  re-­‐mention	  biases	  a	  function	  of	  verb	  class?),	  we	  nonetheless	  considered	  what	  might	  have	  driven	  this	  result.	  Our	  methods	  differed	  from	  those	  of	  H&S	  in	  two	  salient	  respects.	  H&S	  a)	  use	  present	  tense	  and	  b)	  concluded	  with	  a	  novel	  noun	  (Sally	  frightens	  Mary	  because	  she	  is	  a	  dax).	  However,	  because	  this	  resulted	  in	  somewhat	  unnatural	  implicit	  consequentiality	  sentences,	  in	  the	  present	  study	  we	  used	  past	  tense	  and	  concluded	  with	  a	  novel	  verb	  (Sally	  frightened	  Mary	  because	  she	  daxed).	  	  	   In	  a	  follow-­‐up	  experiment,	  we	  ruled	  out	  a	  role	  for	  tense.	  Forty-­‐eight	  native	  English	  speakers	  (26	  female;	  18-­‐58	  y.o.,	  M=33,	  SD=11)	  were	  presented	  with	  20	  randomly-­‐selected	  monosemic	  verbs	  from	  class	  59	  in	  explanation	  discourses	  truncated	  after	  the	  connective	  
because	  (John	  cheated	  Mary	  because…)	  and	  were	  asked	  to	  decide	  whether	  the	  next	  word	  should	  be	  he	  or	  she.13	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  The	  study	  was	  conducted	  on	  Amazon	  Mechanical	  Turk	  and	  participants	  received	  monetary	  compensation.	  An	  additional	  five	  participants	  were	  excluded	  for	  answering	  all	  four	  unambiguous	  filler	  trials	  incorrectly,	  nine	  were	  excluded	  for	  failing	  to	  answer	  every	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   As	  Figure	  6	  shows,	  tense	  had	  little	  effect:	  In	  contrast	  with	  our	  results	  above	  but	  similar	  to	  those	  of	  H&S,	  the	  overall	  results	  were	  numerically	  subject-­‐biased	  regardless	  of	  tense.	  We	  confirmed	  this	  result	  with	  a	  binomial	  mixed	  effects	  model,	  which	  found	  no	  effect	  of	  tense	  (Wald’s	  z<1).14	  Although	  the	  numeric	  subject	  bias	  did	  not	  reach	  significance	  (Wald’s	  z=1.5,	  p=.14),	  verbs	  in	  this	  task	  were	  significantly	  more	  subject-­‐biased	  than	  in	  the	  main	  experiment,	  whether	  treating	  each	  tense	  separately	  or	  combining	  across	  them	  (ps<.00001).	  
	  
Figure	  6.	  Results	  of	  the	  follow-­‐up	  experiment.	  Boxplots	  of	  implicit	  causality	  biases	  for	  class	  59,	  in	  present	  and	  past	  tense.	  	  	  	   Since	  tense	  cannot	  explain	  the	  object	  shift,	  we	  suspect	  that	  the	  culprit	  was	  our	  use	  of	  a	  novel	  verb	  in	  the	  sentence	  continuation,	  rather	  than	  a	  novel	  noun.	  It	  is	  long	  established	  that	  content	  after	  the	  pronoun	  can	  result	  in	  reinterpretation	  of	  the	  pronoun	  (Archibald	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  question,	  and	  three	  were	  excluded	  for	  not	  being	  native	  English	  speakers.	  Whether	  the	  subject	  was	  male	  and	  the	  object	  was	  female	  or	  vice	  versa	  was	  counter-­‐balanced	  within	  and	  between	  participants.	  Two	  orders	  of	  stimuli	  were	  used,	  one	  of	  which	  was	  the	  reverse	  of	  the	  other.	  	  Half	  the	  participants	  saw	  the	  verbs	  in	  present	  tense,	  half	  in	  past	  tense.	  14	  Participants	  and	  verbs	  were	  random	  effects,	  while	  tense	  and	  whether	  the	  male	  character	  was	  
the	  subject	  or	  object	  were	  fixed	  effects	  (the	  latter	  was	  also	  non-­‐significant,	  Wald’s	  z=1.65,	  
p=.10).	  Maximal	  random	  effects	  structure	  was	  used.	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angered	  Bartholomew	  because	  he	  was	  reckless/irritable),	  though	  with	  some	  processing	  cost	  (Caramazza	  et	  al.,	  1977).	  Because	  the	  focus	  in	  the	  re-­‐mention	  literature	  has	  been	  the	  early	  re-­‐mention	  biases	  rather	  than	  these	  post-­‐pronoun	  revision	  processes,	  most	  studies	  are	  designed	  to	  minimize	  the	  effect	  of	  content	  after	  the	  pronoun.	  This	  is	  true	  of	  both	  our	  study	  and	  that	  of	  H&S:	  The	  novel	  nouns	  (H&S)	  and	  verbs	  (present	  study)	  were	  meant	  to	  provide	  content-­‐free	  continuations	  that	  would	  not	  affect	  pronoun	  interpretation	  and	  thus	  would	  provide	  a	  clean	  assay	  of	  the	  verb-­‐	  and	  connective-­‐driven	  re-­‐mention	  biases.	  However,	  explanations	  involving	  predicate	  nouns	  (because	  he	  is	  a	  dax)	  and	  explanations	  involving	  verbs	  (because	  he	  daxed)	  are	  not	  semantically	  equivalent.	  The	  former	  suggest	  a	  stable	  property	  of	  one	  of	  the	  event-­‐participants	  (he	  is	  a	  
swimmer/psychologist/shouter/etc.),	  whereas	  the	  latter	  suggest	  an	  event	  or	  state	  (he	  
shouted/fell/died/etc.).	  The	  data	  suggest	  that	  knowing	  that	  the	  explanation	  involves	  a	  stable	  trait	  did	  not	  affect	  people’s	  intuitions	  about	  who	  the	  explanation	  referred	  to;	  implicit	  causality	  biases	  elicited	  using	  novel	  nouns	  correlate	  at	  ceiling	  rates	  with	  those	  elicited	  in	  sentence	  continuation	  experiments	  in	  which	  there	  is	  no	  material	  after	  the	  pronoun	  (Hartshorne,	  2014).	  In	  contrast,	  it	  appears	  that	  people	  are	  much	  more	  likely	  to	  ascribe	  explanations	  involving	  an	  action	  or	  state	  to	  object	  of	  the	  antecedent.	  Further	  research	  is	  necessary	  to	  determine	  why	  this	  is	  the	  case.	  	  
Kinds	  of	  Causes	  &	  Kinds	  of	  Explanations	  	   On	  most	  semantic	  analyses	  (e.g.,	  Kipper	  et	  al.,	  2006),	  verbs	  in	  classes	  31.1	  (amuse),	  31.4	  (appeal	  to),	  33	  (acclaim),	  45.4	  (age),	  and	  59	  (coax)	  mark	  their	  objects	  as	  affected,	  explaining	  why	  these	  verbs	  are	  object-­‐biased	  in	  implicit	  consequentiality.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  verbs	  in	  classes	  31.2	  (admire)	  and	  31.3	  (agonize	  over)	  is	  the	  experiencer	  of	  a	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mental	  state	  and	  thus	  most	  affected	  by	  the	  situation,	  accounting	  for	  their	  implicit	  consequentiality	  subject	  biases.	  	  	   Likewise,	  several	  previous	  semantic	  analyses	  have	  suggested	  that	  the	  verbs	  in	  classes	  31.1	  (amuse)	  and	  31.4	  (appeal	  to)	  highlight	  the	  causal	  role	  of	  their	  subjects	  whereas	  the	  verbs	  in	  classes	  31.2	  (admire),	  31.3	  (agonize	  over),	  and	  33	  highlight	  the	  causal	  role	  of	  their	  object,	  consistent	  with	  the	  observed	  implicit	  causality	  biases,	  modulo	  the	  object	  shift	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  section	  (cf.	  Kipper	  et	  al.,	  2006;	  McKoon,	  Greene,	  &	  Ratcliff,	  1993).	  	  	   Interpreting	  the	  implicit	  causality	  findings	  for	  the	  verbs	  in	  classes	  45.4	  (age)	  and	  59	  (coax)	  is	  more	  complex,	  in	  part	  because	  these	  verbs	  have	  not	  been	  extensively	  studied.	  Intuitively,	  the	  subjects	  of	  these	  verbs	  are	  causal	  agents,	  and	  indeed	  the	  semantic	  structures	  provided	  by	  VerbNet	  highlights	  the	  causal	  role	  of	  their	  subjects.	  Consistent	  with	  this	  analysis,	  H&S	  find	  a	  slight	  but	  significant	  implicit	  causality	  subject-­‐bias	  for	  these	  verbs	  relative	  to	  the	  grand	  mean	  across	  verbs.	  This	  matches	  what	  we	  found	  in	  our	  follow-­‐up	  experiment	  on	  class	  59	  in	  the	  previous	  section	  (the	  overall	  object	  shift	  in	  our	  main	  experiment	  makes	  that	  experiment	  less	  informative	  for	  this	  issue).	  However,	  this	  subject	  bias	  is	  much	  weaker	  than	  the	  one	  observed	  for	  classes	  31.1	  (amuse)	  and	  31.4	  (appeal	  to).	  While	  this	  finding	  is	  perfectly	  consistent	  with	  our	  broader	  conclusion	  that	  re-­‐mention	  biases	  are	  a	  systematic	  function	  of	  verb	  class,	  it	  is	  intriguing.	  We	  consider	  possible	  explanations	  below.	  	   One	  interesting	  possibility,	  highlighted	  in	  recent	  work	  by	  Bott	  and	  Solstad	  (in	  press),	  is	  that	  different	  verb	  classes	  may	  encode	  different	  kinds	  of	  causes	  (see	  also	  Bittner	  &	  Dery,	  2014).	  Bott	  and	  Solstad	  distinguish	  between	  simple	  causes	  (John	  disturbed	  Mary	  
because	  he	  was	  making	  a	  lot	  of	  noise),	  externally	  anchored	  reasons	  (John	  disturbed	  Mary	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because	  she	  had	  damaged	  his	  bike),	  and	  internally	  anchored	  reasons	  (John	  disturbed	  on	  
purpose	  Mary	  because	  he	  was	  angry	  at	  her)	  (for	  related	  discussion,	  see	  Lombrozo,	  2010).	  They	  argue	  that	  different	  verb	  classes	  differ	  in	  their	  compatibility	  with	  these	  different	  types	  of	  causes,	  an	  intuition	  echoed	  in	  VerbNet’s	  semantic	  representations,	  which	  distinguishes	  several	  types	  of	  causation,	  including	  cause,	  force,	  and	  in	  reaction	  to.	  	  It	  may	  be	  that	  some	  types	  of	  causes	  make	  better	  explanations	  and	  thus,	  by	  extension,	  better	  targets	  for	  implicit	  causality	  bias,	  explaining	  the	  weaker	  effects	  for	  classes	  45.4	  and	  59.	  Such	  a	  result	  would	  have	  broad	  implications	  beyond	  re-­‐mention	  biases,	  since	  with	  a	  few	  exceptions	  (e.g.,	  Verbnet),	  semanticists	  have	  generally	  assumed	  a	  unitary	  notion	  of	  causation.	  Thus,	  this	  may	  be	  a	  profitable	  avenue	  for	  future	  research.	  
Towards	  a	  Generative	  Account	  of	  Re-­‐mention	  Biases	  	   While	  evidence	  for	  the	  semantic	  structure	  account	  is	  not	  yet	  conclusive	  –	  there	  are	  more	  verb	  classes	  to	  be	  tested	  in	  more	  discourse	  contexts	  (e.g.,	  sentences	  involving	  and,	  
but,	  or	  although),	  and	  independently-­‐verified	  semantic	  analyses	  are	  needed	  in	  many	  cases	  –	  the	  above	  results,	  coupled	  with	  previous	  work,	  are	  highly	  promising	  (cf.	  Arnold2001;	  Crinean	  and	  Garnham,	  2006;	  Hartshorne,	  2014;	  Hartshorne	  et	  al.,	  2013;	  Hartshorne	  &	  Snedeker,	  2013).	  This	  leaves	  open	  a	  deep	  question	  about	  re-­‐mention	  biases	  that	  has	  received	  too	  little	  attention:	  How	  and	  why	  do	  listeners	  draw	  on	  semantic	  information	  to	  interpret	  pronouns	  in	  the	  first	  place?	  	   Three	  possibilities	  have	  been	  explored	  in	  some	  detail.	  A	  number	  of	  researchers	  explained	  implicit	  causality	  biases	  by	  arguing	  that	  causes	  are	  salient	  (Garnham,	  Traxler,	  Oakhill,	  &	  Gernsbacher,	  1996;	  McDonald	  &	  MacWhinney,	  1995;	  Song	  &	  Fisher,	  2005),	  assimilating	  the	  phenomenon	  into	  earlier	  theories	  on	  which	  pronouns	  refer	  to	  the	  most	  
	   28	  
salient	  antecedent	  (Evans,	  1980;	  Fletcher,	  1984;	  Gundel,	  Hedberg,	  &	  Zacharski,	  1993;	  Song	  &	  Fisher,	  2005,	  2007;	  van	  Dijk	  &	  Kintsch,	  1983;	  van	  Rij,	  van	  Rij,	  &	  Hendriks,	  2013).	  This	  account	  suffers	  in	  that	  it	  fails	  to	  explain	  implicit	  consequentiality.	  Moreover,	  it	  has	  proven	  difficult	  to	  establish	  that	  causes	  really	  are	  salient	  (cf.	  Garnham	  et	  al.,	  1996;	  McDonald	  &	  MacWhinney,	  1995).	  	  	   Other	  researchers	  have	  suggested	  that	  re-­‐mention	  biases	  arise	  from	  heuristics	  learned	  from	  the	  statistics	  of	  pronoun	  use:	  People	  learn	  that	  in	  certain	  contexts,	  pronouns	  usually	  refer	  to	  the	  previous	  cause,	  whereas	  in	  other	  contexts,	  pronouns	  usually	  refer	  to	  the	  previous	  affected	  entity,	  etc.	  (Crawley	  et	  al.,	  1990;	  Fletcher,	  1984;	  see	  also	  Stevenson	  et	  al.,	  1994).	  Some	  support	  for	  this	  possibility	  comes	  from	  that	  fact	  that	  even	  infants	  can	  learn	  arbitrary	  statistical	  predictors	  of	  upcoming	  components	  of	  the	  speech	  stream	  (Saffran,	  Aslin,	  &	  Newport,	  1996).	  	  While	  the	  flexibility	  of	  this	  approach	  has	  some	  appeal,	  it	  risks	  presupposing	  the	  solution	  to	  the	  problem	  it	  is	  meant	  to	  solve.	  Third-­‐person	  pronouns	  are	  always	  potentially	  ambiguous.	  In	  principle,	  the	  he	  in	  Archibald	  frightens	  Bartholomew	  because	  he	  is	  scary	  could	  refer	  to	  Archibald,	  Bartholomew,	  or	  any	  other	  male	  entity.	  Heuristics	  are	  invoked	  to	  explain	  how	  people	  nonetheless	  converge	  on	  an	  interpretation.	  But	  is	  difficult	  to	  see	  how	  we	  can	  use	  heuristics	  to	  determine	  pronoun	  reference	  if	  we	  must	  use	  pronoun	  reference	  to	  learn	  the	  heuristics	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  A	  third,	  related	  account	  avoids	  this	  circularity	  is	  the	  expectancy	  hypothesis	  	  (Arnold,	  1998,	  2001;	  Arnold	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  Listeners	  learn	  features	  of	  the	  input	  that	  predict	  what	  will	  be	  mentioned	  next.	  These	  expectations	  can	  be	  learned	  from	  cases	  in	  which	  reference	  was	  unambiguous	  (Archibald	  frightens	  Bartholomew	  because	  Archibald	  is	  scary)	  and	  then	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generalized	  to	  sentences	  involving	  prepositions.	  Arnold	  and	  colleagues	  have	  discussed	  two	  ways	  in	  which	  these	  expectations	  might	  be	  built.	  One	  is	  that	  listeners	  may	  learn	  heuristics	  from	  statistical	  correlations	  between	  features	  of	  the	  speech	  stream	  and	  subsequent	  referents	  (Arnold	  et	  al.,	  2007,	  p.	  531).	  In	  this,	  the	  expectancy	  hypothesis	  operates	  much	  like	  the	  heuristics	  account	  described	  above,	  except	  that	  heuristics	  predict	  next-­‐mention	  rather	  than	  pronoun	  reference	  per	  se.	  One	  potential	  limitation	  of	  this	  approach	  is	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  causes	  and	  explanations	  and	  the	  relationship	  between	  affected	  entities	  and	  consequences	  is	  left	  unmotivated.	  People	  learn	  this	  relationship	  because	  it	  is	  a	  feature	  of	  the	  input.	  However,	  if	  the	  statistics	  of	  the	  input	  justified	  it,	  they	  should	  be	  just	  as	  happy	  to	  learn	  that	  explanations	  usually	  refer	  to	  the	  affected	  entity	  rather	  than	  the	  cause.	  One	  might	  wonder	  whether	  rote	  statistical	  learning	  is	  necessary	  to	  learn	  principled,	  motivated	  relationship	  such	  as	  the	  one	  between	  causation	  and	  explanation.	  	  Arnold	  and	  colleagues	  also	  mention	  an	  alternative:	  Listeners	  use	  features	  of	  the	  discourse	  to	  build	  rich	  models	  of	  the	  speaker’s	  intentions	  and	  goals,	  using	  this	  to	  generate	  expectations	  about	  what	  the	  speaker	  might	  refer	  to	  next	  (Arnold	  et	  al.,	  2007,	  p.	  532).	  Although	  intriguing,	  no	  further	  detail	  is	  provided	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  these	  models,	  how	  the	  input	  is	  used	  to	  construct	  the	  models,	  or	  how	  inferences	  are	  derived	  from	  the	  models.	  Building	  on	  the	  insights	  of	  the	  expectancy	  hypothesis	  as	  well	  as	  work	  by	  Kehler	  and	  colleagues	  (Kehler,	  2002;	  Kehler	  et	  al.,	  2008)	  and	  Sagi	  and	  Rips	  (in	  press),	  we	  introduce	  the	  
most	  probable	  message	  (MPM)	  account.	  On	  the	  MPM	  account,	  re-­‐mention	  biases	  are	  a	  manifestation	  of	  a	  much	  broader	  account	  of	  language	  comprehension.	  Listeners	  have	  an	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intuitive	  model	  of	  the	  generative15	  processes	  that	  give	  rise	  to	  speaker	  behavior:	  What	  the	  speaker	  says	  depends	  on	  the	  speaker’s	  goals,	  intentions,	  knowledge	  state,	  and	  –	  most	  importantly	  –	  what	  message	  the	  speaker	  wishes	  to	  convey.	  In	  this,	  we	  build	  on	  recent	  computational	  models	  of	  pragmatics	  (Frank	  and	  Goodman,	  2012;	  Goodman	  and	  Stuhlmuller,	  2013)	  which	  are	  themselves	  rooted	  in	  earlier	  observations	  by	  Grice	  (1989).	  Like	  many	  current	  theories,	  MPM	  assumes	  incremental,	  predictive	  processing	  (Altmann	  &	  Kamide,	  1999;	  Arnold	  et	  al.,	  2001;	  Arnold	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Huang	  &	  Snedeker,	  2011;	  Levy,	  2008;	  Kutas,	  DeLong,	  &	  Smith,	  2011;	  Snedeker,	  2009;	  Tanenhaus,	  Spivey-­‐Knowlton,	  Eberhard,	  &	  Sedivy,	  1995;	  van	  Berkum,	  2008).	  In	  particular,	  the	  listener	  tries	  to	  infer	  the	  speaker’s	  message	  based	  on	  whatever	  information	  is	  currently	  available,	  which	  may	  be	  less	  than	  the	  entire	  utterance.	  For	  the	  moment,	  though,	  we	  consider	  how	  the	  MPM	  account	  handles	  pronouns	  in	  the	  context	  of	  complete	  sentences.	  We	  return	  to	  predictive	  re-­‐mention	  biases	  later.	  Focusing	  just	  on	  the	  pronoun,	  the	  problem	  is	  to	  determine	  its	  intended	  reference	  in	  sentences	  like	  (6),	  which	  reduces	  to	  determining	  which	  sentence	  in	  (7)	  has	  the	  same	  meaning	  as	  (6):	  (6) Archibald	  angered	  Bartholomew	  because	  he	  is	  reckless.	  (7) a.	  Archibald	  angered	  Bartholomew	  because	  Archibald	  is	  reckless.	  b.	  Archibald	  frightened	  Bartholomew	  because	  Bartholomew	  is	  reckless.	  c.	  Archibald	  frightened	  Bartholomew	  because	  Cameron	  is	  reckless.	  d.	  Archibald	  frightened	  Bartholomew	  because	  Dionysus	  is	  reckless.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Here	  we	  use	  the	  term	  generative	  model	  in	  the	  original	  sense	  of	  a	  model	  that	  explains	  how	  some	  observable	  behavior	  was	  generated,	  and	  not	  in	  reference	  to	  a	  particular	  tradition	  of	  syntactic	  theory	  (cf.	  Tenenbaum,	  Kemp,	  Griffiths,	  and	  Goodman,	  2011).	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Etc.	  As	  noted	  by	  Kehler	  et	  al.	  (2008),	  the	  probability	  the	  speaker	  meant	  (7a),	  for	  instance,	  is	  proportional	  to	  the	  probability	  that	  she	  would	  say	  (6)	  given	  that	  she	  meant	  (7a)	  times	  the	  probability	  that	  she	  wanted	  to	  communicate	  (7a)	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  That	  is,	  following	  Bayes’	  rule:	   (8)	  	  P(message	  |	  utterance)	  	  ∝	  P(utterance	  |	  message)	  P(message)	  Note	  that	  speakers	  typically	  only	  use	  pronouns	  to	  refer	  to	  a	  recently-­‐mention	  entity.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  probability	  of	  uttering	  (6)	  –	  which	  has	  a	  pronoun	  –	  when	  intending	  to	  convey	  (7c)	  or	  (7d),	  etc.,	  is	  very	  low,	  since	  Cameron	  and	  Dionysus,	  etc.,	  have	  not	  been	  mentioned	  previously.	  By	  equation	  (8),	  (6)	  is	  unlikely	  to	  mean	  anything	  other	  than	  (7a)	  or	  (7b),	  as	  desired.	  	   It	  remains	  to	  explain	  why	  (7a)	  is	  preferred	  to	  (7b).	  Again,	  expectations	  about	  the	  speaker’s	  behavior	  play	  a	  critical	  role.	  By	  hypothesis,	  the	  probability	  that	  the	  speaker	  would	  want	  to	  convey	  a	  particular	  message	  depends	  on	  whether	  that	  message	  is	  true,	  whether	  the	  speaker	  knows	  it	  is	  true,	  and	  what	  the	  speaker	  is	  motivated	  to	  communicate	  (Grice,	  1989).	  Note	  that	  in	  all	  the	  examples	  described	  in	  this	  paper,	  we	  know	  nothing	  about	  the	  speaker’s	  intentions	  or	  her	  knowledge	  of	  the	  world.	  We	  do,	  however,	  know	  what	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  true:	  Archibald	  being	  reckless	  is	  much	  more	  likely	  to	  result	  in	  Archibald	  angering	  Bartholomew	  than	  is	  Bartholomew	  being	  reckless,	  and	  so	  the	  speaker	  is	  more	  likely	  a	  priori	  to	  want	  to	  convey	  (7a)	  than	  (7b).	  Thus,	  by	  equation	  (8),	  the	  most	  likely	  interpretation	  of	  (6)	  is	  (7a),	  as	  desired.	  A	  similar	  analysis	  applies	  straightforwardly	  to	  implicit	  consequentiality	  sentences.	  Archibald	  angered	  Bartholomew	  so	  he	  plotted	  revenge	  most	  likely	  refers	  to	  Bartholomew	  plotting	  revenge	  because	  that	  results	  in	  an	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interpretation	  of	  the	  sentence	  that	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  actually	  be	  true	  of	  the	  world.16	  Note	  that	  this	  captures	  the	  widely-­‐shared	  intuition	  that	  linguistic	  ambiguity	  is	  often	  resolved	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  more	  plausible	  interpretation	  (Frank	  &	  Goodman,	  2012;	  Garnsey,	  Pearlmutter,	  Myers,	  &	  Lotocky,	  1997;	  Grice,	  1989;	  Hobbs,	  Stickel,	  Appelt,	  &	  Martin,	  1993;	  McRae,	  Spivey-­‐Knowlton,	  &	  Tanenhaus,	  1998).	  	   Now	  we	  turn	  to	  verb	  bias	  –	  the	  topic	  of	  the	  present	  work.	  Again,	  we	  would	  like	  to	  know	  which	  interpretation	  of	  a	  pronoun	  (10)	  is	  meant	  to	  be	  conveyed	  by	  some	  sentence	  (9).	  	   (9) 	  	   Archibald	  angered	  Bartholomew	  because	  he…	  (10) a.	  Archibald	  angered	  Bartholomew	  because	  Archibald…	  b.	  Archibald	  angered	  Bartholomew	  because	  Bartholomew…	  c.	  Archibald	  angered	  Bartholomew	  because	  Cameron…	  d.	  Archibald	  angered	  Bartholomew	  because	  Dalton…	  …	  Unlike	  in	  the	  previous	  case,	  we	  have	  not	  yet	  heard	  the	  entire	  sentence.	  For	  this	  reason,	  we	  cannot	  directly	  compare	  the	  prior	  probabilities	  that	  (10a)	  and	  (10b)	  are	  true	  for	  the	  simple	  reason	  that	  we	  do	  not	  know	  what	  events	  these	  partial	  sentences	  refer	  to.	  One	  possibility	  would	  be	  to	  sum	  over	  all	  possible	  continuations	  of	  the	  sentence.	  Unfortunately,	  there	  are	  an	  infinite	  number	  of	  possible	  continuations,	  making	  this	  a	  difficult	  computational	  problem,	  particularly	  since	  listeners	  can	  calculate	  implicit	  causality	  biases	  within	  a	  few	  hundred	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  We	  are	  indebted	  to	  Sagi	  &	  Rips	  (in	  press)	  for	  the	  suggestion	  of	  using	  the	  probabilities	  of	  the	  events	  themselves.	  Among	  the	  many	  differences	  between	  our	  approach	  and	  theirs	  is	  that	  rather	  than	  invoking	  Gricean	  reasoning,	  Sagi	  &	  Rips	  embed	  their	  theory	  in	  the	  notion	  of	  causal	  identity:	  What	  makes	  he	  in	  likely	  to	  refer	  to	  Archibald	  in	  (6)	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  and	  Archibald	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  causally	  related.	  We	  are	  currently	  attempting	  to	  tease	  apart	  these	  two	  accounts	  in	  ongoing	  research.	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milliseconds	  of	  encountering	  the	  pronoun	  (Koornneef	  and	  van	  Berkum,	  2006;	  Pyykkonen	  and	  Jarvikivi,	  2010;	  inter	  alia).	  	   The	  semantic	  structure	  account	  suggests	  a	  possible	  fast	  approximation.	  From	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  verb	  anger,	  we	  know	  that	  there	  is	  at	  least	  one	  cause	  of	  Archibald	  angering	  Bartholomew	  that	  involves	  Archibald.	  There	  may	  be	  other	  causes	  as	  well,	  and	  they	  may	  involve	  Archibald,	  Bartholomew,	  or	  even	  other	  people.	  However,	  all	  else	  being	  equal,	  it	  is	  more	  likely	  that	  the	  explanation	  of	  Archibald	  angering	  Bartholomew	  will	  involve	  Archibald	  for	  the	  simple	  reason	  that	  we	  know	  at	  least	  one	  such	  explanation	  exists.	  Thus,	  interpreting	  (9)	  such	  that	  he	  refers	  to	  Archibald	  results	  in	  a	  proposition	  that	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  actually	  be	  true	  than	  interpretations	  where	  he	  refers	  to	  Bartholomew.	  Listeners	  who	  are	  sensitive	  to	  this	  fact	  would	  exhibit	  the	  standard	  re-­‐mention	  bias.	  	   This	  account	  has	  several	  key	  features	  that	  differentiate	  it	  from	  other	  accounts.	  Unlike	  salience	  accounts,	  it	  incorporates	  discourse	  structure.	  Unlike	  heuristic	  and	  expectancy	  accounts,	  re-­‐mention	  biases	  are	  derived	  from	  the	  structure	  of	  language	  and	  thought	  rather	  than	  learned	  from	  correlations	  in	  the	  input.	  There	  is	  no	  explicit	  salience	  hierarchy	  or	  expectedness	  hierarchy;	  re-­‐mention	  biases	  are	  not	  expectations	  about	  reference	  but	  rather	  manifestations	  of	  current	  beliefs	  about	  what	  the	  speaker	  is	  saying,	  based	  on	  the	  best	  available	  evidence.	  There	  is	  much	  left	  to	  be	  done	  to	  flesh	  out	  and	  test	  this	  account,	  a	  process	  currently	  underway	  (Hartshorne,	  O’Donnell,	  and	  Tenenbaum,	  in	  prep).	  However,	  we	  believe	  that	  it	  provides	  a	  potentially	  promising	  avenue	  for	  further	  research	  and	  consideration.	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Conclusion	  	   Above,	  we	  present	  data	  from	  502	  verbs,	  showing	  that	  implicit	  causality	  and	  consequentiality	  biases	  are	  a	  systematic	  function	  of	  Levin	  verb	  class.	  This	  represents	  by	  far	  the	  largest	  survey	  of	  implicit	  consequentiality	  biases	  to	  date,	  and	  thus	  these	  data	  should	  serve	  to	  test	  and	  constrain	  all	  theories.	  We	  argue	  that	  in	  particular	  these	  results	  support	  a	  theory	  on	  which	  the	  semantic	  information	  underlying	  re-­‐mention	  biases	  is	  encoded	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  language,	  rather	  than	  inferred	  from	  general	  knowledge	  about	  the	  world.	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Appendix:	  Results	  by	  Verb	  (Chose	  Subj	  /	  N)	  
Verb	   	   class	   Result	   Explanation	  abashed	   31.1	   14/46	   15/41	  affected	   31.1	   16/44	   22/42	  afflicted	   31.1	   7/35	   30/61	  affronted	   31.1	   10/49	   15/42	  aggravated	   31.1	   11/36	   31/51	  aggrieved	   31.1	   14/48	   25/43	  agitated	   31.1	   9/48	   25/45	  agonized	   31.1	   12/31	   21/46	  alarmed	   31.1	   7/44	   37/48	  alienated	   31.1	   22/45	   17/46	  amazed	   31.1	   15/38	   30/38	  amused	   31.1	   12/39	   41/54	  angered	   31.1	   14/39	   34/52	  antagonized	   31.1	   11/33	   12/41	  appalled	   31.1	   15/38	   25/46	  appeased	   31.1	   15/43	   19/54	  aroused	   31.1	   10/45	   36/58	  assuaged	   31.1	   17/42	   8/44	  astonished	   31.1	   9/33	   34/47	  astounded	   31.1	   16/40	   30/42	  awed	   	   31.1	   23/53	   23/47	  baffled	   	   31.1	   8/39	   30/42	  befuddled	   31.1	   14/43	   22/39	  beguiled	   31.1	   16/43	   18/42	  bewildered	   31.1	   10/34	   33/51	  bewitched	   31.1	   16/51	   15/50	  boggled	   31.1	   17/48	   17/38	  bored	   	   31.1	   15/49	   26/35	  bugged	  	   31.1	   6/59	   20/35	  calmed	  	   31.1	   8/35	   12/46	  captivated	   31.1	   14/37	   34/49	  
chagrined	   31.1	   16/45	   16/64	  charmed	   31.1	   14/38	   31/48	  cheered	   31.1	   12/51	   5/42	  comforted	   31.1	   8/34	   4/51	  confounded	   31.1	   15/38	   29/54	  confused	   31.1	   12/32	   32/42	  consoled	   31.1	   18/44	   8/50	  contented	   31.1	   14/44	   19/56	  cowed	   	   31.1	   17/43	   12/58	  daunted	   31.1	   16/51	   21/46	  dazed	   	   31.1	   15/39	   30/42	  dazzled	   31.1	   13/44	   38/54	  dejected	   31.1	   13/35	   12/57	  delighted	   31.1	   11/43	   34/47	  demoralized	   31.1	   10/46	   16/69	  depressed	   31.1	   11/41	   27/48	  disappointed	   31.1	   16/34	   49/60	  discombobulated	   31.1	   9/42	   20/49	  discomfitted	   31.1	   17/42	   23/46	  discomposed	   31.1	   20/59	   14/46	  disconcerted	   31.1	   22/49	   30/49	  disgraced	   31.1	   12/36	   16/42	  disgruntled	   31.1	   17/48	   27/58	  disgusted	   31.1	   19/41	   29/51	  disheartened	   31.1	   11/36	   25/48	  disillusioned	   31.1	   12/38	   31/52	  dismayed	   31.1	   14/33	   30/64	  dispirited	   31.1	   12/34	   26/56	  displeased	   31.1	   12/39	   28/46	  disquieted	   31.1	   21/54	   30/65	  dissatisfied	   31.1	   16/34	   33/48	  distracted	   31.1	   15/48	   29/47	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distressed	   31.1	   15/47	   38/53	  disturbed	   31.1	   18/48	   22/33	  diverted	   31.1	   12/39	   13/47	  elated	   	   31.1	   10/29	   23/42	  electrified	   31.1	   12/38	   18/51	  embarrassed	   31.1	   14/45	   24/41	  emboldened	   31.1	   9/41	   30/52	  enchanted	   31.1	   12/39	   29/55	  enervated	   31.1	   15/46	   23/50	  engrossed	   31.1	   12/41	   25/38	  enlightened	   31.1	   12/35	   17/52	  enlivened	   31.1	   11/37	   24/44	  enraged	   31.1	   10/37	   30/44	  enraptured	   31.1	   16/32	   17/38	  entertained	   31.1	   8/37	   13/42	  enthralled	   31.1	   10/31	   33/51	  enthused	   31.1	   15/47	   28/47	  entranced	   31.1	   9/43	   27/51	  exasperated	   31.1	   11/48	   25/37	  excited	  	   31.1	   8/39	   29/49	  exhausted	   31.1	   9/44	   26/38	  exhilarated	   31.1	   17/48	   30/51	  fascinated	   31.1	   18/47	   36/53	  fatigued	   31.1	   5/28	   30/47	  fazed	   	   31.1	   7/39	   20/48	  flabbergasted	   31.1	   12/36	   30/42	  floored	  	   31.1	   20/56	   16/49	  flustered	   31.1	   12/47	   34/57	  frustrated	   31.1	   12/41	   28/42	  galled	   	   31.1	   19/38	   18/49	  galvanized	   31.1	   14/37	   15/57	  gratified	   31.1	   21/51	   14/42	  grieved	  	   31.1	   14/31	   13/52	  
harmed	   31.1	   20/47	   7/42	  haunted	   31.1	   15/44	   14/51	  heartened	   31.1	   16/48	   16/44	  horrified	   31.1	   12/56	   45/59	  humbled	   31.1	   9/46	   18/50	  humiliated	   31.1	   8/40	   14/47	  hypnotized	   31.1	   11/49	   16/49	  impaired	   31.1	   16/39	   26/64	  impressed	   31.1	   18/43	   41/49	  incensed	   31.1	   17/47	   27/53	  inflamed	   31.1	   11/40	   25/61	  infuriated	   31.1	   11/48	   30/49	  inspired	   31.1	   9/32	   45/56	  interested	   31.1	   13/38	   36/55	  intimidated	   31.1	   10/44	   31/45	  intoxicated	   31.1	   14/43	   27/54	  intrigued	   31.1	   15/42	   20/39	  invigorated	   31.1	   11/47	   23/40	  irked	   	   31.1	   13/45	   29/50	  irritated	   31.1	   11/42	   34/55	  jaded	   	   31.1	   19/47	   9/36	  jollified	  	   31.1	   11/41	   9/43	  maddened	   31.1	   15/47	   27/43	  menaced	   31.1	   12/43	   11/47	  mesmerized	   31.1	   19/48	   27/40	  miffed	   	   31.1	   15/44	   26/51	  molested	   31.1	   14/36	   10/46	  mollified	   31.1	   9/35	   17/52	  mortified	   31.1	   15/40	   29/44	  mystified	   31.1	   15/43	   39/47	  nauseated	   31.1	   13/39	   32/46	  nettled	  	   31.1	   16/38	   16/52	  numbed	   31.1	   9/38	   11/52	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obsessed	   31.1	   18/40	   21/47	  occupied	   31.1	   10/37	   15/51	  offended	   31.1	   21/44	   30/38	  outraged	   31.1	   15/54	   44/61	  overawed	   31.1	   15/44	   28/54	  overwhelmed	   31.1	   15/47	   38/60	  pacified	   31.1	   14/47	   13/53	  pastered	   31.1	   11/35	   12/46	  peeved	  	   31.1	   12/56	   32/53	  perplexed	   31.1	   9/41	   37/51	  perturbed	   31.1	   9/42	   36/52	  piqued	  	   31.1	   15/44	   20/47	  placated	   31.1	   14/40	   9/57	  plagued	   31.1	   10/44	   5/48	  pleased	   31.1	   16/43	   33/50	  preoccupied	   31.1	   8/31	   23/43	  puzzled	   31.1	   5/25	   28/50	  rankled	   31.1	   7/37	   15/44	  ravished	   31.1	   12/35	   10/43	  reassured	   31.1	   10/33	   12/47	  recharged	   31.1	   12/32	   9/50	  refreshed	   31.1	   16/44	   21/46	  rejuvanated	   31.1	   13/41	   18/60	  relaxed	  	   31.1	   15/51	   26/48	  repelled	   31.1	   20/57	   17/38	  repulsed	   31.1	   22/55	   28/47	  revitalized	   31.1	   10/39	   31/60	  revolted	   31.1	   16/40	   22/57	  riled	   	   31.1	   11/50	   19/45	  ruffled	   	   31.1	   11/46	   17/44	  saddened	   31.1	   16/38	   25/33	  satiated	   31.1	   19/53	   23/50	  satisfied	   31.1	   11/39	   31/51	  
scandalized	   31.1	   8/27	   15/46	  scared	   	   31.1	   14/39	   30/46	  solaced	  	   31.1	   16/47	   5/47	  spellbound	   31.1	   18/55	   22/41	  spooked	   31.1	   14/55	   34/48	  startled	   31.1	   6/50	   34/51	  stunned	   31.1	   13/42	   28/47	  stupefied	   31.1	   11/35	   18/39	  surprised	   31.1	   8/37	   30/46	  tantalized	   31.1	   10/38	   27/51	  taunted	   31.1	   8/42	   5/58	  terrorized	   31.1	   9/37	   10/49	  threatened	   31.1	   7/50	   4/38	  thrilled	  	   31.1	   7/41	   34/49	  titillated	   31.1	   3/33	   22/44	  tormented	   31.1	   6/33	   5/51	  tortured	   31.1	   11/41	   7/56	  transfixed	   31.1	   7/35	   21/45	  troubled	   31.1	   16/43	   28/44	  unnerved	   31.1	   18/51	   32/47	  unsettled	   31.1	   17/49	   32/38	  uplifted	   31.1	   17/47	   13/43	  upset	   	   31.1	   20/55	   38/47	  vexed	   	   31.1	   12/34	   25/44	  wearied	   31.1	   22/39	   36/59	  worried	   31.1	   12/47	   26/43	  wounded	   31.1	   16/44	   12/49	  wowed	  	   31.1	   15/40	   38/56	  abhorred	   31.2	   35/45	   5/59	  admired	   31.2	   32/43	   1/39	  adored	  	   31.2	   38/53	   4/55	  appreciated	   31.2	   34/60	   2/44	  bewailed	   31.2	   22/40	   8/48	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cherished	   31.2	   28/36	   4/59	  deified	   	   31.2	   19/32	   9/48	  deplored	   31.2	   23/36	   6/48	  despised	   31.2	   33/39	   3/47	  detested	   31.2	   41/46	   3/52	  disbelieved	   31.2	   22/33	   4/42	  disdained	   31.2	   32/43	   5/51	  disliked	   31.2	   34/41	   1/48	  distrusted	   31.2	   32/39	   1/63	  dreaded	   31.2	   48/54	   3/62	  envied	   	   31.2	   48/61	   3/44	  esteemed	   31.2	   32/39	   8/55	  exalted	  	   31.2	   13/35	   8/44	  execrated	   31.2	   16/48	   6/52	  favored	   31.2	   30/46	   3/43	  feared	   	   31.2	   55/63	   4/43	  grudged	   31.2	   17/26	   5/44	  hated	   31.2	   40/44	   1/40	  idolized	   31.2	   32/35	   3/52	  lamented	   31.2	   30/42	   8/58	  loathed	  	   31.2	   35/43	   4/53	  loved	   	   31.2	   38/42	   2/56	  missed	  	   31.2	   45/51	   19/56	  mourned	   31.2	   22/32	   9/50	  pitied	   	   31.2	   29/42	   2/51	  preferred	   31.2	   26/40	   4/59	  prized	   	   31.2	   31/46	   9/49	  regretted	   31.2	   37/44	   12/50	  relished	   31.2	   37/50	   1/43	  resented	   31.2	   22/29	   4/54	  respected	   31.2	   41/45	   3/65	  revered	   31.2	   34/44	   3/47	  rued	   	   31.2	   29/51	   3/43	  
agonized	  over	   31.3	   24/34	   5/44	  angered	  over	   31.3	   35/44	   4/51	  anguished	  over	   31.3	   31/37	   6/43	  approved	  of	   31.3	   28/37	   3/48	  bled	  for	   31.3	   18/38	   8/41	  cared	  about	   31.3	   38/42	   12/57	  cared	  for	   31.3	   48/60	   15/49	  cheered	  at	   31.3	   7/46	   1/54	  cried	  for	   31.3	   22/36	   12/48	  delighted	  in	   31.3	   41/51	   7/56	  delighted	  over	   31.3	   12/29	   2/47	  despaired	  of	   31.3	   34/42	   6/40	  disapproved	  of	  31.3	   25/36	   3/50	  enthused	  at	   31.3	   10/52	   5/44	  enthused	  over	   31.3	   18/40	   8/55	  exulted	  at	   31.3	   9/32	   5/45	  exulted	  in	   31.3	   29/41	   4/42	  exulted	  over	   31.3	   26/44	   14/51	  feared	  for	   31.3	   43/43	   4/44	  felt	  for	   	   31.3	   39/44	   9/47	  fretted	  about	   31.3	   33/42	   3/46	  fretted	  over	   31.3	   25/43	   7/52	  fumed	  at	   31.3	   21/57	   2/45	  fumed	  over	   31.3	   24/44	   2/45	  gladdened	  at	   31.3	   12/46	   11/59	  gloated	  over	   31.3	   16/41	   8/40	  grieved	  for	   31.3	   39/46	   4/33	  grieved	  over	   31.3	   41/47	   6/52	  gushed	  over	   31.3	   18/51	   4/54	  hungered	  over	  31.3	   27/37	   10/44	  maddened	  at	   31.3	   23/45	   5/43	  marveled	  at	   31.3	   23/39	   2/46	  marveled	  over	   31.3	   19/36	   2/40	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meditated	  over	  31.3	   40/56	   10/61	  minded	  about	   31.3	   32/37	   14/56	  mooned	  about	   31.3	   15/27	   12/51	  mooned	  over	   31.3	   15/37	   13/49	  moped	  over	   31.3	   22/36	   8/40	  mourned	  for	   31.3	   37/43	   6/49	  mourned	  over	   31.3	   44/52	   5/47	  mused	  over	   31.3	   16/30	   8/59	  obsessed	  over	   31.3	   28/40	   8/59	  puzzled	  over	   31.3	   32/41	   6/44	  raged	  at	   31.3	   7/37	   4/51	  raged	  over	   31.3	   25/43	   5/35	  reacted	  to	   31.3	   29/48	   5/45	  reflected	  over	   31.3	   30/45	   14/57	  rejoiced	  about	   31.3	   27/46	   7/47	  rejoiced	  at	   31.3	   16/44	   5/45	  rejoiced	  in	   31.3	   27/40	   6/42	  rejoiced	  over	   31.3	   20/45	   10/55	  rhapsodied	  over	   31.3	   19/35	   3/45	  rhapsodized	  about	   31.3	   21/45	   7/41	  ruminated	  over	   31.3	   31/40	   7/44	  saddened	  at	   31.3	   24/43	   6/57	  sickened	  of	   31.3	   45/53	   8/45	  thrilled	  at	   31.3	   15/41	   3/38	  tired	  of	  	   31.3	   27/33	   4/54	  wearied	  of	   31.3	   32/39	   3/43	  wept	  for	   31.3	   24/35	   11/62	  wondered	  at	   31.3	   16/38	   5/56	  appealed	  to	   31.4	   19/47	   22/49	  grated	  on	   31.4	   13/43	   25/48	  jarred	  on	   31.4	   13/41	   15/52	  abused	  	   33	   11/39	   8/49	  acclaimed	   33	   13/44	   8/51	  
accursed	   33	   12/35	   3/49	  assailed	   33	   16/46	   6/52	  assaulted	   33	   15/35	   6/61	  attacked	   33	   18/41	   3/49	  belittled	   33	   9/44	   2/48	  blamed	  	   33	   24/38	   5/47	  blasphemed	   33	   11/26	   6/53	  blessed	  	   33	   8/33	   3/54	  castigated	   33	   10/44	   1/58	  celebrated	   33	   23/39	   5/56	  censured	   33	   7/40	   4/46	  chastened	   33	   6/41	   1/53	  chastised	   33	   11/38	   1/40	  chided	   	   33	   13/43	   5/39	  commended	   33	   12/43	   3/50	  complimented	   33	   11/56	   7/47	  condemned	   33	   17/50	   2/40	  condoned	   33	   20/42	   5/56	  congratulated	   33	   7/43	   3/43	  criticized	   33	   14/51	   4/60	  cursed	   	   33	   9/41	   6/42	  damned	   33	   18/49	   1/43	  defamed	   33	   19/50	   11/56	  denigrated	   33	   10/38	   6/43	  denounced	   33	   7/33	   3/53	  deprecated	   33	   18/53	   8/52	  derided	   33	   11/47	   4/43	  disparaged	   33	   12/40	   9/56	  eulogized	   33	   19/30	   5/39	  excoriated	   33	   18/42	   8/56	  excused	   33	   13/35	   4/45	  extoled	  	   33	   17/40	   4/48	  faulted	  	   33	   16/39	   3/56	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felicitated	   33	   12/33	   8/44	  forgave	  	   33	   19/38	   2/45	  gibed	   	   33	   14/38	   6/55	  greeted	   33	   11/44	   12/40	  hailed	   	   33	   8/26	   7/50	  heralded	   33	   19/46	   6/42	  honored	   33	   20/47	   6/53	  impeached	   33	   12/32	   2/50	  incriminated	   33	   21/47	   10/49	  indicted	   33	   15/45	   3/54	  lambasted	   33	   10/37	   3/44	  lampooned	   33	   9/37	   7/56	  lauded	   	   33	   9/39	   3/43	  maligned	   33	   14/49	   5/53	  mocked	   33	   10/47	   3/43	  penalized	   33	   9/38	   3/44	  persecuted	   33	   22/54	   1/36	  praised	  	   33	   6/37	   3/53	  prosecuted	   33	   15/40	   3/48	  punished	   33	   7/27	   2/43	  rebuked	   33	   17/46	   6/57	  recompensed	   33	   19/46	   14/47	  remunerated	   33	   14/33	   7/42	  reprimanded	   33	   15/47	   4/42	  reproached	   33	   13/50	   4/38	  reproved	   33	   12/37	   4/42	  repudiated	   33	   15/39	   6/57	  reviled	  	   33	   23/37	   5/58	  ridiculed	   33	   13/44	   1/45	  scolded	   33	   10/50	   2/46	  scorned	   33	   18/36	   2/54	  slandered	   33	   15/34	   5/39	  snubbed	   33	   12/42	   1/30	  
stigmatized	   33	   13/42	   6/61	  thanked	   33	   16/44	   4/43	  upbraided	   33	   18/44	   0/50	  victimied	   33	   16/39	   5/60	  vilified	   	   33	   18/45	   4/36	  abased	  	   45.4	   7/37	   7/50	  abated	   	   45.4	   22/52	   11/52	  abraded	   45.4	   15/42	   6/46	  activated	   45.4	   19/47	   15/57	  africanized	   45.4	   12/37	   1/45	  aged	   	   45.4	   13/34	   16/48	  americanized	   45.4	   12/40	   9/50	  anesthetized	   45.4	   14/45	   5/55	  anglicized	   45.4	   14/39	   10/43	  animated	   45.4	   13/34	   16/46	  apostatized	   45.4	   18/45	   3/40	  augmented	   45.4	   12/38	   15/54	  awaked	   45.4	   10/37	   9/45	  awakened	   45.4	   10/39	   27/62	  balanced	   45.4	   19/46	   23/62	  beautified	   45.4	   16/37	   14/56	  blackened	   45.4	   18/52	   9/56	  bleached	   45.4	   14/39	   8/35	  bloodied	   45.4	   17/34	   7/47	  capacitated	   45.4	   12/45	   5/37	  catholicized	   45.4	   21/45	   4/54	  cauterized	   45.4	   19/52	   1/62	  christianized	   45.4	   16/44	   10/61	  civilized	   45.4	   18/53	   19/62	  commercialized	   45.4	   13/40	   10/58	  constricted	   45.4	   4/41	   12/39	  contextualized	  45.4	   27/46	   8/49	  cooled	   	   45.4	   19/51	   5/44	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corrected	   45.4	   9/37	   3/42	  corrupted	   45.4	   16/50	   18/51	  cremated	   45.4	   40/56	   6/56	  deafened	   45.4	   11/30	   24/48	  decelerated	   45.4	   13/41	   6/43	  deflated	   45.4	   12/38	   12/56	  degraded	   45.4	   9/45	   3/45	  demobilized	   45.4	   12/46	   8/55	  devalued	   45.4	   15/39	   5/49	  dilated	  	   45.4	   22/59	   10/44	  disintegrated	   45.4	   29/47	   4/47	  domesticated	   45.4	   19/56	   7/56	  dried	   	   45.4	   11/42	   3/39	  effeminated	   45.4	   14/36	   10/51	  emaciated	   45.4	   21/53	   9/40	  embittered	   45.4	   18/45	   28/47	  embrocated	   45.4	   19/35	   8/55	  energized	   45.4	   15/40	   15/40	  europeanized	   45.4	   18/43	   8/45	  feminized	   45.4	   23/42	   14/46	  fertilized	   45.4	   12/44	   9/54	  halted	   	   45.4	   16/40	   3/43	  healed	   	   45.4	   10/35	   12/46	  hellenized	   45.4	   14/39	   5/44	  improved	   45.4	   24/58	   32/62	  incinerated	   45.4	   25/52	   6/53	  incubated	   45.4	   16/37	   6/54	  levitated	   45.4	   24/46	   5/44	  liquefied	   45.4	   21/44	   5/48	  mellowed	   45.4	   8/30	   18/54	  moderated	   45.4	   16/38	   7/54	  modernized	   45.4	   16/41	   14/56	  muddied	   45.4	   14/40	   11/51	  
neutralized	   45.4	   17/50	   7/42	  objectified	   45.4	   13/40	   5/40	  obscured	   45.4	   24/52	   14/44	  paralyzed	   45.4	   24/44	   20/59	  perfected	   45.4	   33/47	   18/49	  popularized	   45.4	   18/47	   13/55	  publicized	   45.4	   6/40	   3/45	  quieted	  	   45.4	   14/55	   4/46	  quietened	   45.4	   16/32	   8/38	  reanimated	   45.4	   21/52	   17/49	  reddened	   45.4	   17/44	   13/51	  resuscitated	   45.4	   8/33	   4/45	  reversed	   45.4	   11/43	   13/54	  revived	  	   45.4	   15/42	   10/49	  sank	   	   45.4	   17/40	   5/48	  secularized	   45.4	   18/42	   8/46	  shushed	   45.4	   7/41	   0/52	  slowed	  	   45.4	   15/52	   32/61	  softened	   45.4	   11/39	   16/43	  sovietized	   45.4	   17/45	   9/64	  stabilized	   45.4	   15/53	   10/42	  steadied	   45.4	   14/41	   5/48	  sterilized	   45.4	   5/33	   6/44	  strengthened	   45.4	   14/37	   28/50	  submerged	   45.4	   16/50	   4/48	  tamed	   	   45.4	   18/53	   20/48	  toppled	   45.4	   15/37	   9/29	  toughened	   45.4	   7/32	   10/52	  tranquilized	   45.4	   10/48	   3/60	  wakened	   45.4	   11/45	   10/43	  warmed	   45.4	   12/44	   12/47	  weakened	   45.4	   9/42	   33/59	  westernized	   45.4	   19/49	   12/50	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woke	   	   45.4	   6/24	   16/47	  allured	  	   59	   14/43	   34/63	  arm-­‐twisted	   59	   8/49	   8/49	  bamboozled	   59	   16/50	   16/41	  blackmailed	   59	   17/57	   12/60	  bluffed	  	   59	   15/43	   11/51	  bribed	   	   59	   18/46	   14/48	  bullocked	   59	   13/35	   4/60	  cajoled	  	   59	   12/40	   3/48	  coaxed	  	   59	   11/48	   13/53	  coerced	   59	   13/52	   8/36	  commissioned	   59	   25/44	   6/46	  compelled	   59	   11/40	   20/55	  dared	   	   59	   10/42	   12/50	  deceived	   59	   17/45	   23/59	  deluded	   59	   10/38	   22/56	  duped	   	   59	   16/46	   11/47	  ensnared	   59	   16/49	   12/38	  entrapped	   59	   21/49	   8/51	  fooled	   	   59	   17/48	   28/42	  forced	   	   59	   6/39	   8/63	  harried	  	   59	   8/43	   14/64	  
hijacked	   59	   18/41	   7/44	  hoodwinked	   59	   9/30	   18/55	  hustled	  	   59	   19/51	   11/45	  impelled	   59	   14/42	   10/41	  induced	   59	   9/34	   5/47	  influenced	   59	   18/48	   41/53	  inveigled	   59	   22/46	   10/48	  lured	   	   59	   15/55	   11/44	  manipulated	   59	   13/34	   8/43	  misled	   	   59	   19/37	   24/46	  obligated	   59	   14/45	   22/55	  obliged	  	   59	   11/39	   9/44	  panicked	   59	   8/40	   30/42	  pressured	   59	   8/51	   10/60	  prompted	   59	   7/41	   7/51	  roused	   	   59	   9/39	   17/52	  seduced	   59	   13/33	   19/57	  spurred	   59	   10/50	   7/56	  sweet-­‐talked	   59	   8/50	   12/45	  tricked	  	   59	   13/40	   17/57	  	  
	  
